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NOTES
PREVENTING TERRORISM BY PROSECUTING
MATERIAL SUPPORT
Brian P. Comerford*
The most important aspect of the war on terror is the application of
the rule of law to break the backs of terrorist organizations.'
INTRODUCTION
In the years since September 11, federal prosecutors have intensi-
fied their efforts to bring criminal prosecutions as part of the war on
terror. An essential tool in these efforts is the material support stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits the provision of material sup-
port to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
Using the material support statute, the government has charged a
number of defendants in the war on terror, including John Walker
Lindh and the "Lackawanna Six" defendants. Although often de-
scribed as a terrorist financing law, 2 recent cases illustrate the impor-
tance of the material support statute not just to restrict terrorist
fundraising, but to combat all types of support to terrorist organiza-
tions. The material support statute is essential to fighting terrorism
because it allows prosecutors to act before a terrorist plot has been
initiated and eliminate potential terrorist threats.
Critics have challenged the constitutionality of the material sup-
port statute on a variety of theories, and some courts have been recep-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.S., Computer
Science, Comell University, 2001. I would like to thank ProfessorJimmy Gurul6 for
his comments and suggestions, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their hard work on this Note.
1 Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Speech at Notre Dame Law School (Feb. 2,
2004).
2 See, e.g., Terrorist Financing, U.S. A-rr'vs BuLL. (Executive Office for U.S. Attor-
neys, Office of Legal Educ., Washington, D.C.), July 2003, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usab5104.pdf.
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tive.3 The majority of courts, however, have upheld the material
support statute in criminal cases against those accused of aiding ter-
rorist organizations. 4
Despite the controversy that generally surrounds material sup-
port prosecutions, courts have largely upheld the statute and have per-
mitted the federal government to go forward with prosecutions of
great importance to the war on terror.5 If the rule of law is to be
successful in fighting the war on terror, it is necessary that tools such
as the material support statute be available to federal prosecutors in
their efforts. Without the material support statute, prosecutors would
be unable to combat many terrorist threats. They would be confined
to prosecuting acts of, and conspiracies to commit, terrorism. Prose-
cutors must be equipped with adequate tools to prevent acts of terror-
ism and respond to all terrorist threats.
In this Note, I first explain the elements of the material support
statute and the process by which terrorist groups are officially desig-
nated. I then illustrate how the statute is used and why it is necessary
by recounting a recent material support case involving the "Lack-
awanna Six." Finally, I summarize the reported cases where defend-
ants have challenged § 2339B's constitutionality and attempt to find
some common ground among the differing applications of the
statute.
I. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B: THE MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTE
Eighteen U.S.C. § 2339B (the material support statute) prohibits
the provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist orga-
nizations. 6 The statute was originally enacted as part of the Anti-Ter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19967 (AEDPA), and was
3 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. United States Dep't of Justice (Humani-
tarian Law Project III), 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding § 2339B impermis-
sibly vague); United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1058-59 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (finding the designation statute unconstitutional and holding that no § 2339B
prosecution can therefore rely on it as a predicate).
4 See, e.g., United States v. AI-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2004);
United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 193 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v.
Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 546 (E.D. Va. 2002).
5 See, e.g., Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1343; Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 193; Lindh,
212 F. Supp. 2d at 546. In addition, several courts have applied the material support
statute in unreported cases. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 33 (referring to
approximately twenty cases prosecuted under the material support statute).
6 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
7 Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214.
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intended to combat terrorist financing and support in the United
States.8
Under the material support statute, it is unlawful to "knowingly
provide [ ] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organi-
zation."9 "Material support or resources" are defined as
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses,
false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, trans-
portation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious
materials. 1
0
A "foreign terrorist organization" is an organization designated as
such by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (the designation
statute). Under the designation statute, the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to designate a group as a terrorist organization after finding
that the group engages in terrorist activity and is a threat to the
United States.' 1 The designation may be reviewed if challenged by
the organization within thirty days.
12
Although it has been on the books since AEDPA was enacted in
1996, the material support statue was not used until 2002, when the
government charged defendants in Charlotte, North Carolina, with
funneling the profits of their illegal cigarette smuggling ring to the
terrorist group Hezbollah.1 3 Since then, prosecutors have charged
material support in about twenty criminal cases, 14 including the John
Walker Lindh case 15 and the "Lackawanna Six" case.
16
II. MATERIAL SUPPORT IN ACTION
The first priority of the government in fighting terrorism is pre-
vention.1 7 The material support statute is an essential tool in the war
on terror because it allows federal prosecutors to bring a case before
8 Id. § 301(b), 110 Stat. at 1247.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1).
10 Id. § 2339A(b).
11 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2000).
12 Id. § 1189(b)(1). This challenge must be brought within thirty days in the
Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id.
13 See Terrorist Financing, supra note 2, at 28-29.
14 Id.
15 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 546 (E.D. Va. 2002).
16 United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 193 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
17 U.S. Att'y Gen.John Ashcroft, Remarks on FBI Reorganization (May 29, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/O52902agtranscriptsredesign-
ingfbi.htm.
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any acts of terrorism have been committed. By allowing prosecutors
to act when there is a definite threat of terrorism, but before a terror-
ist plot is initiated, the material support statute empowers federal
prosecutors to prevent terrorism and not merely prosecute terrorist
acts. To understand the importance of the § 2339B material support
statute, it helps to closely examine the facts of an actual § 2339B case.
Following is a description of the facts surrounding United States v. Goba
(the "Lackawanna Six" case), which involved several Muslim men
from Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, New York. The men traveled
to Afghanistan, trained at an al-Qaeda training camp, returned to the
United States, and were subsequently convicted of providing material
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. To appreciate
the importance of § 2339B, consider the potential threat posed by the
Lackawanna defendants and the inability of other statutes to deal with
that threat absent additional evidence that was not available and
would have required waiting for the terrorist suspects to take further
action.
A. The Lackawanna Defendants
Kamal Derwish was born in Buffalo, New York, in 1973.18 His
family later moved and he was raised in Saudi Arabia.1 9 In 1997, the
Saudi government deported Derwish for extremist activities 20 and he
returned to the Buffalo area.21 Upon returning, Derwish began
preaching a strict form of Islam to the local community of approxi-
mately 3000 Yemeni Muslims. 22 Although many Muslims in the com-
munity did not agree with his conservative teachings, he found
support among a group of young Muslim men, 23 for whom he held
regular meetings in his apartment.24 In the spring of 2000, Derwish
recruited some of these young men to make a "religious pilgrimage"
abroad.25
18 James Sandler, Kamal Derwish: The Life and Death of an American Terrorist, PBS,
Oct. 16, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/
derwish.html.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Jason Felch, "The Closer": An Al Qaeda Recruiter in the United States, PBS, Oct. 16,
2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/juma.
html.
24 Sandler, supra note 18.
25 Id.
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In the spring of 2001, Derwish invited Juma al-Dosari (a visiting
Imam from a mosque in Bloomington, Indiana) to give a sermon to
the local Muslim community in Lackawanna, New York.26 In his ser-
mon, al-Dosari spoke about the political struggles of Muslims around
the world.27 Al-Dosari's radical message offended leaders of the local
Muslim community, but he was welcomed to attend the meetings of
Derwish and his followers. 28 Shortly after al-Dosari's arrival, several of
Derwish's followers agreed to travel to Afghanistan to attend a military
training camp.29 Sahim Alwan, one of the Lackawanna defendants,
would later explain he traveled to the camp because he wanted to see
the "warrior part" of Islam-he felt the need to prepare in case he was
called to go to war for jihad.30 Although Alwan denies that he knew
about their ultimate destination, several of the Lackawanna men have
since admitted that they knew they were traveling to an al-Qaeda train-
ing camp. 31
The men first agreed on a cover story that they were traveling to
Pakistan for religious training.32 The men paid for their plane tickets
with cash 33 and then split into two groups for the journey to Afghani-
stan. 34 The first group (Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, and Shafal
Mosed)315 flew to Karachi, Pakistan, and traveled to the al-Farooq
training camp in Afghanistan a few days later.3 6 The second group
(Sahim Alwan, Jaber Elbaneh, Mukhtar al-Bakri, and Yahya Goba)
flew to Pakistan where they met up with Derwish.37 After traveling
from Pakistan to Afghanistan, two members of this second group, Al-
wan and Elbaneh, stayed at an al-Qaeda guest house where they met
26 Felch, supra note 23.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 A1-Bakri Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CR-214-S).
30 Interview by Lowell Bergman with Sahim Alwan, defendant in the Lackawanna
case (July 24, 2003) [hereinafter Interview with Sahim Alwan], available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/interviews/alwan.html.
31 Frontline: Chasing the Sleeper Cell (PBS television broadcast, Oct. 16, 2003).
32 Interview with Sahim Alwan, supra note 30.
33 Decision and Order at 15, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 02-M-107).
34 Al-Bakri Plea Agreement at 2, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 02-CR-214-S).
35 Chronology: The Lackawanna Investigation, PBS, Oct. 16, 2003 [hereinafter Chro-
nology], at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/cron.
html.
36 Criminal Complaint and Affidavit at 7-10, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (02-M-
107).
37 Chronology, supra note 35.
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personally with Osama bin Laden.38 Eventually, both of the Lack-
awanna groups arrived at the al-Farooq training camp. 39
Al-Farooq was a terrorist training camp run by al-Qaeda in Af-
ghanistan. 40 When the Lackawanna groups traveled there in 2001,
there were approximately 200 men training at the camp.4' While at
the camp, the Lackawanna men were given code names and received
training on the use of firearms and explosives. 42 The Lackawanna
men joined other al-Farooq trainees to attend speeches given by
Osama bin Laden. 43 Although one of the Lackawanna men, Alwan,
left the camp after only ten days, the rest continued their training for
several weeks. 44 After leaving the camp, the Lackawanna men re-
turned to the United States, with the exception of Derwish and
Elbaneh, who remained overseas. 45
B. The Investigation
While the Lackawanna men were still training at the al-Farooq
camp in Afghanistan, the FBI field office in Buffalo, New York, re-
ceived a hand-written letter from an anonymous individual in the
Lackawanna Yemeni community. 46 The letter alleged that several
men had traveled to Afghanistan to train with al-Qaeda and meet with
Osama bin Laden. 47 The FBI investigated and interviewed some of
the Lackawanna men, who denied traveling to Afghanistan and
claimed they had traveled to Pakistan for religious training. 48
Two weeks after September 11, 2001, Juma al-Dosari (who had
helped recruit the Lackawanna men) left Buffalo to fight with the
Taliban in Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, he was captured by U.S.
forces, detained as an enemy combatant, and transferred to Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.49 While under interrogation at Guantanamo Bay, al-
38 Alwan Plea Agreement at 2-3, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 02-CR-214-S).
39 Chronology, supra note 35.
40 The al-Farooq training camp has since been destroyed. See Phil Hirschkorn,
Cable News Network, L.P., Buffalo Terror Suspect Admits al Qaeda Training, at http://
www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/20/buffalo.terror (May 20, 2003).
41 Criminal Complaint and Affidavit at 8, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (02-M-107).
42 Al-Bakri Plea Agreement at 3, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 02-CR-214-S).
43 Alwan Plea Agreement at 3, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (No. 02-CR-214-S).
44 Id.
45 See Frontline: Chasing the Sleeper Cell supra note 31.
46 See Chronology, supra note 35.
47 Id.
48 Criminal Complaint and Affidavit at 5-6, Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (02-M-
107).
49 See Chronology, supra note 35.
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Dosari revealed to federal agents that the Lackawanna men had trav-
eled to a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. 50
In the spring of 2002, the FBI intercepted communications be-
tween Derwish (the Lackawanna preacher who recruited the Lack-
awanna men) and several important al-Qaeda figures, including
Osama bin Laden's son. This connection between the Lackawanna
men and the al-Qaeda hierarchy concerned government investigators,
who feared that they had uncovered a sleeper cell awaiting instruc-
tions from al-Qaeda. 51 Throughout the summer of 2002, the FBI care-
fully watched the Lackawanna suspects. 52 They were reluctant to
immediately arrest the suspects because delaying "allowed [them] to
launch the investigation for a much longer period of time, and hope-
fully identify other [al-Qaeda] throughout the United States and over-
seas."53  During this time, the President was updated on the
Lackawanna investigation virtually every day. 54
Late in the summer of 2002, the CIA intercepted an e-mail sent
by al-Bakri (one of the Lackawanna trainees) to his brother.55 The e-
mail, as translated by the FBI, stated:
How are you, my beloved? God willing, you are fine. I would like to
remind you, the next meal will be very huge. No one will be able to
withstand it, except for those with faith. There are people here who
had visions, and their visions were strong. Their visions were ex-
plained that this will be very strong. No one will be able to bear it.5 6
Al-Bakri later admitted to investigators that in this e-mail the
"meal" was a code, and referred to "a large explosion that was being
planned by al-Qaeda against Americans. 57
50 Interview by Lowell Bergman with Dale Watson, Assistant Director, FBI
Counterterrorism Division, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Inter-
view with Dale Watson], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/sleeper/interviews/watson.html.
51 See Chronology, supra note 35.
52 Id.
53 See Interview with Dale Watson, supra note 50.
54 Frontline: Chasing the Sleeper Cell, supra note 31 (airing a statement by Director
of Homeland Security Tom Ridge).
55 Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Where the Trail Led: Between Evidence and
Suspicion; Unclear Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003,
§ 1 (Magazine), at 1.
56 Susan Candiotti, Cable News Network, L.P., Prosecutors: No Bail for Six Accused of
Helping al Qaeda, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/18/buffalo.terror.probe/
(Sept. 19, 2002). A1-Bakri's brother, appearing as though he did not understand the
code, replied: "Anyway, what meal are you talking about? I swear I don't understand
anything. Is it a hamburger meal or what?" Purdy & Bergman, supra note 55.
57 Candiotti, supra note 56.
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Around this time, some at the CIA labeled the Lackawanna group
"the most dangerous terrorist group in the United States," 58 and FBI
officials began to worry whether the covert operation could guarantee
the Lackawanna group was not preparing to launch a terrorist at-
tack.59 These concerns culminated on the anniversary of the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, when federal authorities decided to take overt action
against the men from Lackawanna. 60
On September 11, 2002, al-Bakri was at his wedding in the Per-
sian Gulf country of Bahrain.61 At the request of the CIA, al-Bakri was
detained by police in Bahrain.62 During FBI interrogation, al-Bakri
identified the other Lackawanna men who had trained in Afghani-
stan. On September 13, 2002, federal agents in Buffalo, New York,
arrested Alwan, Galab, Goba, Mosed, and Taher (the other Lack-
awanna trainees). 63 They were arraigned on September 14 and
charged under § 2339B with providing material support to al-Qaeda.
All six of the Lackawanna defendants have since pleaded guilty to pro-
viding material support. 64
Derwish (the preacher who recruited the Lackawanna men) was
killed in Yemen when a CIA Predator drone destroyed the car he was
traveling in with other suspected al-Qaeda terrorists. 65 Elbaneh (the
Lackawanna trainee who remained overseas) was arrested in Yemen in
January 2004, and is currently in the custody of Yemeni authorities. 66
Al-Dosari (the al-Qaeda recruiter/Taliban fighter) is reportedly still
under detention as an enemy combatant at Guantanamo Bay.67
58 Purdy & Bergman, supra note 55.
59 See Interview with Dale Watson, supra note 50 (stating that "there are no guar-
antees in this business").
60 Purdy & Bergman, supra note 55.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Dan Herbeck, Sentencing Debate Rages Over 'Lackawanna Six, 'BUFF. NEWS, Dec.
1, 2003, at Al.
64 See AI-Bakri Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CR-214-5); Alwan Plea Agreement at 1, Goba, 240 F. Supp.
2d 242 (No. 02-CR-214-5).
65 See Purdy & Bergman, supra note 55.
66 Dan Herbeck, Kin, Officials Sure of Elbaneh Jailing in Yemen, BuFF. NEWS, Feb. 22,
2004, at C3. The FBI website, however, still lists him as wanted. See FBI Seeking Infor-
mation-Jaber A. Elbaneh, at http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elbaneh.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2005).
67 Dan Herbeck, Fifth Member of Six Gets Seven Years in Prison, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 17,
2003, at BI.
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C. The Need for the Material Support Statue
Consider the options available to the federal government in late
summer 2002. Several individuals had confirmed that the Lack-
awanna suspects secretly traveled to Afghanistan to train with al-Qaeda
and meet with Osama bin Laden. The FBI and CIA then intercepted
suspicious communications from the Lackawanna suspects raising
concerns of a potential terrorist attack. While the government viewed
the Lackawanna suspects as a definite terrorist threat, they lacked evi-
dence of a specific terrorist plot and could not successfully charge the
group with conspiracy or attempt of a substantive terrorist crime.
Without the material support statute, federal prosecutors would have
been powerless to incapacitate what they viewed as a definite terrorist
threat. The government would have been forced to "wait and see" if
the suspects were, in fact, planning to commit a terrorist attack.
Using the material support statute, however, federal prosecutors
were able to charge the Lackawanna defendants with providing mate-
rial support to al-Qaeda. To obtain a conviction, federal prosecutors
had to prove only that the defendants had provided this "material sup-
port" to al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda was a designated foreign terrorist
organization. 68 Section 2339B allowed federal authorities to take the
potentially dangerous Lackawanna defendants into custody-and pre-
vent the possibility of them committing a terrorist attack-based on
the limited information available to them. Without this statute, fed-
eral officials would have been forced to wait for the Lackawanna de-
fendants to take action and potentially endanger the local
community. FBI director Robert Mueller dismissed this "wait-and-see"
option, as he explained:
Do you and the American people want us to take the chance, if we
have information where we believe that a group of individuals is
poised to commit a terrorist act in the United States that'll kill
Americans? Should we take the chance where we believe we have
intelligence, we have information, we have evidence, that they're
poised to commit an attack, and we just should let it go and wait for
the attack, and then conduct our investigation after the fact? I think
not. I think the American people expect us to investigate, to de-
velop the intelligence, and to prevent the next attack.69
As illustrated by its use in the Lackawanna case, the § 2339B ma-
terial support statute plays an essential role in the war on terrorism.
68 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
69 Interview by Lowell Bergman with Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI (Sept.
12, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/in-
terviews/mueller.
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By charging defendants under § 2339B, the government can counter
the threat of a suspected sleeper cell without waiting for the group to
take action (with potentially devastating consequences). Although
the material support statute was originally intended to fight terrorist
funding, it serves an equally important purpose in allowing federal
prosecutors to charge those who support terrorist organizations by
other means.
D. A RICO Analogy
One way to understand the need for the material support statute
in fighting terrorism is to analogize it to the federal RICO laws. The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute was
passed as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.70
Prior to the passage of RICO, prosecutors were unable to effectively
combat the mob.71 Organized crime groups were involved in narcot-
ics trafficking, illegal gambling, prostitution, extortion, public corrup-
tion, and many other criminal offenses. While there were statutes
prohibiting each of these criminal acts, prosecutors could generally
only convict the low-level mobsters who committed these acts and not
the upper-level kingpins who managed and profited from the criminal
activity. 72 If convicted, these low-level offenders were quickly replaced
and the organized crime group continued with little disruption. 73
RICO solved this problem by criminalizing the organized crime group
itself. Under RICO, federal prosecutors could join all of the defend-
ants in a criminal organization and try them for conducting an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.7 4 RICO responded to
an evolved form of crime that traditional laws were inadequate to
handle.
Like RICO, the material support statute also responds to an
evolved form of crime: terrorism. Terrorism is different from tradi-
tional crime because it is uniquely destructive and the perpetrators
often do not live to be punished. Any response to terrorism must fo-
cus on prevention of future terrorist acts. If terrorism were a typical
crime, the government might consider preventing terrorism through
deterrent measures, such as tougher penalties and stricter enforce-
70 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
71 See Benjamin Scotti, Comment, RICO vs. 416-BIS: A Comparison of U.S. and Ital-
ian Anti-Organized Crime Legislation, 25 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 147-50
(2002).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
[VOL. 8o"2
PROSECUTING MATERIAL SUPPORT
ment. Terrorists, however, cannot be deterred; if an offender is will-
ing to die for his actions, no fear of punishment will discourage him.
The only option is to incapacitate terrorists before a plot has been initi-
ated and before members of the public are harmed. Statutes that
merely criminalize terrorist acts are inadequate because they target
completed crimes. Prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to commit ter-
rorist acts is only marginally better because the public is put at great
risk when prosecutors wait until an act of terrorism is sufficiently close
to commission. The only acceptable response to terrorism is to
criminalize support of the terrorist group. This allows prosecutors to
act when an offender trains with, joins, and potentially lies in wait for
instructions from, a foreign terrorist organization.
III. CHALLENGES TO 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
Federal prosecutions under the material support statue have
been highly controversial. Academic commentators and defense law-
yers have lodged serious challenges to the material support statute
and the corresponding designation statute (8 U.S.C. § 1189). Their
arguments have included challenges for vagueness and overbreadth in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, challenges that the stat-
ute imposes guilt by association, challenges that the statutes violates
due process by not requiring personal guilt and not providing for
meaningful review of designation, and finally challenges that prosecu-
tion under § 2339B violates the Geneva Convention. Although some
challenges have been successful, courts have upheld § 2339B in cases
where the government is prosecuting defendants for providing sub-
stantial support to a foreign terrorist organization. Following is a de-
tailed analysis of these challenges and how courts have reacted to
them in recent § 2339B cases.
A. Does § 2339B Impose Guilt by Association in Violation of the
First Amendment?
Academics and criminal defendants have challenged § 2339B on
the grounds that it imposes guilt by association in violation of the First
Amendment. Some have even likened the law to the anti-Communist
legislation of the McCarthy era.75 The government has responded
75 David Cole, Editorial, Fight Terrorism Fairly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A17;
Interview by Lowell Bergman with David Cole, Professor, Georgetown University Law
Center (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/sleeper/interviews/cole.html.
The material support for terrorist organization statute, which the Lack-
awanna people were, pled guilty to, is an extremely broad statute. In my
2005]
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that the law does not criminalize association with, but rather support of
terrorist organizations. 76
While the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amend-
ment protects the right to associate, "[n]either the right to associate
nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute. '77 The
Court has explained that "[e]ven a significant interference with pro-
tected rights of political association may be sustained if the State dem-
onstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. '78
1. United States v. Lindh79
In Lindh, the defendant, John Walker Lindh, challenged his
§ 2339B indictment on the ground that it violated his First Amend-
ment right to freedom of association. 80 Lindh's argument was essen-
tially that he had a constitutional right under the First Amendment to
associate with foreign groups and that the § 2339B indictment in-
fringed on this right.81 The court easily dispensed of this argument,
stating:
Lindh is not accused of merely associating with a disfavored or sub-
versive group whose activities are limited to circulating inflam-
matory political or religious material exhorting opposition to the
government. Far from this, Lindh is accused ofjoining groups that
view, it's essentially a resurrection of guilt by association, the watchword of
the McCarthy era.... The government does not have to show that the indi-
vidual intended to further any terrorist activity in the organization. They
don't have to show any link between what the individual did and any terror-
ist or otherwise violent action of the recipient group.
Id.
76 Interview by Lowell Bergman with Alice Fisher, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral (June 30, 2003) (explaining that the Lackawanna case was more than mere asso-
ciation), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/
interviews/fisher.html.
Well, it's not their association with an organization alone. You have to look
at all the facts that they pled guilty to. And in this case they left America,
they went abroad, they trained in Al Qaeda camp, which they knew to be an
Al Qaeda camp. They watched videos of the Al Qaeda attack on the USS
Cole, which killed many of our soldiers. They listened to bin Laden. They
talked about attacks on America. And then they came back.
Id.
77 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (quoting United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
78 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
79 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).
80 Id. at 569-70.
81 Id. at 569.
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do not merely advocate terror, violence, and murder of innocents;
these groups actually carry out what they advocate and those who
join them, at whatever level, participate in the groups' acts of terror,
violence, and murder. 82
The court concluded by holding that the First Amendment guar-
antee of free association does not extend to providing material sup-
port to designated foreign terrorist organizations.
83
2. Humanitarian Law Project
In the Humanitarian Law Project line of cases, the plaintiffs-legal
and social service organizations-sought to provide funding and legal
counseling to "the non-violent humanitarian and political activities" of
two designated foreign terrorist organizations.8 4 Fearing criminal lia-
bility if this aid was considered material support under § 2339B, the
plaintiffs sued to enjoin the Justice Department from enforcing
§ 2339B against them.8 5 In Humanitarian Law Project 1,86 the plaintiffs
argued for an injunction on the theory that § 2339B imposed guilt by
association in violation of the First Amendment.
The Humanitarian Law Project I court dismissed the plaintiffs' ar-
gument that § 2339B imposed guilt by association. The court clarified
that "[§ 2339B] only limits the permissible ways in which Plaintiffs can
associate with [designated foreign terrorist organizations], rather than
punishing Plaintiffs' ability to exercise their First Amendment right to
associate with [designated foreign terrorist organizations] alto-
gether."87 The court further reasoned that the government had a sub-
stantial interest in maintaining national security, and that § 2339B
restricted conduct no more than was necessary to protect that inter-
est.88 The court concluded § 2339B was not an unconstitutional limi-
tation on the First Amendment freedom of association. 89
To summarize, although "guilt by association" is a popular criti-
cism of § 2339B, it has not been effective in practice. Courts have
been unwilling to characterize § 2339B as criminalizing mere associa-
82 Id.
83 Id. at 569-70.
84 Humanitarian Law Project III, 352 F.3d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 2003).
85 Id.
86 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (Humanitarian Law Project I), 9 F. Supp.
2d 1205 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
87 Id. at 1212.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1212-13.
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tion with a designated terrorist group.9 0 Furthermore, to the extent
that § 2339B does implicate First Amendment association rights,
courts have found that § 2339B serves a substantial government inter-
est in protecting national security and is sufficiently tailored to that
interest.9 1 Despite condemnation by civil libertarians,9 2 § 2339B has
effectively withstood the challenge that it imposes guilt by association
in violation of the First Amendment.
B. Is § 2339B Impermissibly Vague in Violation of the First and
Fifth Amendments?
Another common criticism of § 2339B is that it is unconstitution-
ally vague in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. Critics have
specifically pointed to the prohibitions on providing support in the
forms of "personnel," "training," and "communications equipment,"
arguing that the terms are so vague that a defendant does not have
fair notice of what conduct is criminalized and what conduct is not.
In explaining the reasoning behind a vagueness challenge, the
Supreme Court has stated: "Because we assume that man is free to
steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. '9 3 Courts have
held that this requirement of sufficient clarity derives from the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.9 4 (The First Amendment is
implicated when the law is so vague that it threatens the exercise free
speech or association.) 95
90 See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rec-
ognizing that acts by the defendant were beyond mere association).
91 Humanitarian Law Project , 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
92 See Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterror Weapon
of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15. ("Civil libertarians and defense lawyers...
are increasing their criticism of [§ 2339B] and the [Justice] department's aggressive
use of it, saying the prosecutions smack of a McCarthylike notion of guilt by
association.").
93 Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
94 United States v. Makowski, 120 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1997).
95 Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99 ("Perhaps the most important factor
affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to
inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law inter-
feres with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test
should apply.").
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1. Humanitarian Law Project
Several courts have considered vagueness challenges to § 2339B.
In the Humanitarian Law Project line of cases, the plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of § 2339B on the
grounds that it was impermissibly vague. The district court (in Hu-
manitarian Law Project 1) granted the plaintiffs' motion, and enjoined
the Justice Department from enforcing § 2339B against the named
plaintiffs.96 The court held that the "[p] laintiffs [had] demonstrated
a [probability] of success on the merits and irreparable injury based
on their claim that [§ 2339B] is impermissibly vague because it fails to
provide adequate notice as to what constitutes 'material support or
resources."'97 The court further reasoned that the terms "personnel"
and "training" were not sufficiently clear to give fair notice to of what
conduct was prohibited. The court elaborated that it was uncertain
whether § 2339B would extend to the type of support plaintiffs sought
to provide, namely distribution of literature and training in interna-
tional human rights law.
98
In Humanitarian Law Project H,99 the Justice Department appealed
the district court injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On the issue of vagueness, the government urged the court to con-
strue the "personnel" prohibition to require an element of direction
or control. The court rejected this construction, holding: "While we
construe a statute in such a way as to avoid constitutional questions...
we are not authorized to rewrite the law so it will pass constitutional
muster."100 The court also upheld the district court's holding with
respect to the "training" prohibition-explaining that "training" was
so vague as to possibly encompass counseling on international human
rights law. The court explained (and perhaps instructed), however,
that there would not be a vagueness problem if the term were limited
to "military training or training in terrorist activities. '" 10 1
2. United States v. Lindh
In Lindh, the defendant, John Walker Lindh, challenged his
§ 2339B indictment on the ground that § 2339B was unconstitution-
ally vague with respect to the meaning of "personnel." To make this
96 Humanitarian Law Project , 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 & n.31.
97 Id. at 1213.
98 Id.
99 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (Humanitarian Law Project II), 205 F.3d
1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
100 Id. at 1137-38.
101 Id. at 1138.
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argument, Lindh relied heavily on the Humanitarian Law Project II
holding discussed above. 102 The Lindh court explained the plain
meaning of "personnel" to be "an employment or employment-like
relationship between the persons in question and the terrorist organi-
zation."' 0 3 In so doing, the Lindh court rejected the analysis of Hu-
manitarian Law Project II, reasoning that § 2339B was aimed at
stopping terrorist groups from obtaining human resources and not
the "independent advocacy" of an organization's agenda.10 4 The
court concluded that § 2339B gave fair notice of what conduct was
prohibited, and was therefore not unconstitutionally vague.'0 5
3. The Lackawanna Case: United States v. Goba 10 6
In Goba, (the Lackawanna case discussed in Part I), the defend-
ants challenged their § 2339B indictment for vagueness and argued
that the district court should follow the holding of Humanitarian Law
Project II, specifically that §2339B was unconstitutionally vague with re-
spect to its prohibition on the provision of personnel. The govern-
ment responded by citing the holding in Lindh (which rejected
Humanitarian Law Project II's finding of vagueness) .107 The court dis-
tinguished Humanitarian Law Project II from Lindh on the basis that
the former was a civil case seeking injunctive relief, while the latter
involved a criminal prosecution for a § 2339B violation.1 08 Finding
the Lindh precedent more compelling, the Goba court rejected the
defendants' argument that § 2339B was unconstitutionally vague. l0 9
4. United States v. Sattar 10
In Sattar, the government charged the defendants under § 2339B
for providing a "communications pipeline" for the imprisoned Sheikh
Abdel Rahman (convicted for the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing).' ' The defendants-including Lynne Stewart, Sheikh Abdel
Rahman's lawyer-had allegedly transmitted messages in the form of
phone calls and press statements from the Sheikh to members of
102 See United States v. Lindh, 121 F. Supp. 2d 541, 573 (E.D. Va. 2002).
103 Id. at 574.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
107 Id. at 194.
108 Id. at 193-94.
109 Id. at 194.
110 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
111 Id. at 352-53.
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Gama'a al-Islamiyya, a designated foreign terrorist organization.1 12
The defendants challenged § 2339B on the ground that it was uncon-
stitutionally vague in violation of the First Amendment,' l 3 specifically
the prohibitions on providing material support in the form of "com-
munications equipment" and "personnel.""
14
First, the Sattar defendants challenged on vagueness grounds
§ 2339B's prohibition on the provision of "personnel."" 15 The Sattar
court rejected the Lindh precedent and found that it was not suffi-
ciently clear from the text of the statute what exactly constituted provi-
sion of personnel. Specifically, the Sattar court was troubled by the
constitutional implications if "provision of personnel" extended to in-
clude a lawyer acting on behalf of her client-in this case Lynne Stew-
art acting on behalf of her client Sheikh Abdel Rahman, the leader of
a foreign terrorist organization. 1 6 The court was concerned that in
the absence of clear statutory limits on what conduct was criminalized,
the standards would be left to be developed by the government."
7
Second, with respect to the prohibition on providing material
support in the form of communications equipment, the Sattar court
considered the legislative history of § 2339B and found that Congress
did not intend for simply making a telephone call to be criminalized
under § 2339B.1'8 Therefore, "by criminalizing the mere use of
phones and other means of communication the statute provides
neither notice nor standards for its application."' 19 The court criti-
cized the government for "evolving" its definition of "communications
equipment" throughout the case, and stated that this evolution illus-
trated the lack of prosecutorial standards alleged in a vagueness chal-
lenge.' 20 The Sattar court held that § 2339B was void for vagueness as
applied to the prohibition on providing material support in the form
of "personnel" and "communications equipment."'
21
5. Reconciling the Contrary Holdings on Vagueness
As illustrated above, the litigation as to whether § 2339B is imper-
missibly vague in violation of the Constitution has been extensive.
112 Id. at 356-57.
113 Id. at 356.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 358.
116 Id. at 359.
117 Id. at 359-60.
118 Id. at 357-58.
119 Id. at 358.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 361.
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Courts have differed on how the terms "personnel," "training," and
"communications equipment" should be viewed. The Goba and Lindh
courts have been willing to construe § 2339B such that it is constitu-
tional. (Specifically, they have interpreted "personnel" as meaning an
employment or employment-like relationship.) The Humanitarian
Law Project and Sattar courts, however, have held that § 2339B's
prohibitions fail to give a defendant fair notice of what conduct is
criminalized and what is not.
One could argue that the distinction in these cases has less to do
with the law than with the facts surrounding the particular parties.
The Goba and Lindh defendants were accused of traveling to the Mid-
dle East and training at al-Qaeda terrorist camps. In contrast, the
plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project were social service organizations
seeking to provide funding and counseling to the humanitarian and
political activities of a designated organization. Likewise, the defend-
ants in Sattar were accused only of passing messages-via press re-
leases and phone calls-from an imprisoned sheikh to a designated
organization. Critics may contend that these cases differ solely be-
cause of the publicity that surrounded the Goba and Lindh cases and
public opinion that the defendants in these cases posed a real terrorist
threat. Given this public awareness and perception, these critics may
assume that the Goba and Lindh courts were unwilling to recognize
any constitutional challenges to the validity of the statue.
There is, however, a more legitimate way to distinguish the con-
trary holdings on vagueness. The Supreme Court has explained that a
more stringent standard of vagueness should apply where constitu-
tionally protected rights are threatened. 122 The Humanitarian Law
Project and Sattar courts were concerned with the threatening of par-
ticular constitutional rights in the context of the individual cases. In
Humanitarian Law Project, the court was concerned that § 2339B could
extend to criminalize counseling on human rights law-presumably
in violation of the First Amendment. 123 Likewise, in Sattar, the court
was concerned that § 2339B could prohibit serving as counsel to a
member of a terrorist organization in a criminal case. 124 In contrast,
the defendants in Goba and Lindh could not successfully argue the
existence of a constitutional right protecting their participation in
and support of a terrorist organization.
122 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982).
123 Humanitarian Law Project II, 205 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
124 Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
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Because the Humanitarian Law Project and Sattar courts found
constitutionally protected rights were threatened by the application of
§ 2339B to their defendants, they applied a more stringent standard
of vagueness than the Goba and Lindh courts. Under a more stringent
standard, and in light of potential criminalization of constitutionally
protected conduct, the Humanitarian Law Project and Sattar courts jus-
tifiably found vagueness. In contrast, the Goba and Lindh defendants
could not successfully argue that their conduct was constitutionally
protected, and thus the more lenient standard for vagueness applied.
Under that more lenient standard, the Goba and Lindh courts found a
clear application where § 2339B was not impermissibly vague-specifi-
cally the provision of personnel by participating in a terrorist training
camp-and found no impermissible vagueness.'
25
C. Is § 2339B Unconstitutionally Overbroad?
Some defendants have challenged § 2339B on the theory that it is
unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is void for overbreadth if it
prohibits a broad range of constitutionally protected conduct.12 6 The
Supreme Court has held that to succeed in a facial challenge for over-
breadth "'it is not enough for a plaintiff to show "some" over-
breadth.'. . . Rather, 'the overbreadth of a statute must not only be
real, but substantial as well."
' 127
1. United States v. Lindh
In Lindh, the defendant, John Walker Lindh, raised the defense
that section § 2339B was unconstitutionally overbroad in its prohibi-
tion on the provision of "personnel."128 Lindh argued that the prohi-
bition against providing "personnel" encompassed a substantial
amount of conduct constitutionally protected under the First Amend-
ment freedom of association. The court dismissed Lindh's over-
breadth challenge, holding that when "personnel" was construed to
mean employees or quasi-employees, there was no legitimate danger
of infringing upon the First Amendment freedom of association.
29
125 See United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); United
States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 574 (E.D. Va. 2002).
126 Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984).
127 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584 (2002) (internal citations omitted) (quot-
ing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 896 (1997); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615 (1973)).
128 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
129 Id. at 573.
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2. United States v. Sattar
In Sattar, the defendants asserted that § 2339B was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, particularly
with respect to the prohibitions on providing material support in the
form of "communications equipment" and "personnel."1 3 0 The Sattar
court applied the substantial overbreadth standard after finding that
the statute was aimed not at regulating speech, but conduct.'l3 Find-
ing that Congress had a legitimate interest in prohibiting terrorist fun-
draising, the Sattar court rejected the defendants' overbreadth
challenges. 13 2
Due to the difficulty in establishing substantial overbreadth and
Congress's strong interest in stopping terrorist funding and protect-
ing national security, defendants have not successfully argued that
§ 2339B is unconstitutionally overbroad. In addition, the Justice De-
partment has exercised caution in bringing material support of terror-
ism cases. Like RICO prosecutions (which must withstand an
extensive approval process to avoid the development of overly restric-
tive case law that could result from the prosecution of constitutionally
suspect cases), 133 charges under § 2339B must receive approval from
the Justice Department's Counterterrorism Office prior to being pros-
ecuted.' 3 4 By cautiously selecting § 2339B cases, the government has
ensured the viability of the material support statute against arguments
that it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
D. Does the Material Support Statute Violate the Fifth Amendment by Not
Requiring Proof of Personal Guilt?
Several defendants have argued that § 2339B violates the Fifth
Amendment because it does not require the government to prove an
element of personal guilt.13 5 The Supreme Court considered the is-
sue of personal guilt in Scales v. United States.136 In Scales, the defen-
dant was charged with violating the membership clause of the Smith
130 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
131 Id. at 362 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
132 Id.
133 ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, RACKET-
EER INFLUENCED & CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
217-19 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/
usam/title9/rico.pdf.
134 U.S. DEP'T OFJusTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-91.100 (2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/91mcrm.htm.
135 See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project III, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. AI-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
136 367 U.S. 203, 205 (1961).
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Act,13 7 which criminalized knowing membership in an organization
which advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government-specifically
the Communist Party.' 38 The Court, finding an implied intent re-
quirement in the statute, 139 upheld the constitutionality of the Smith
Act's membership clause. 140 The Court reasoned that a defendant
who "actively and knowingly works in the ranks of [an] organization"
to promote the criminal ends of that organization is no more immune
from prosecution than a defendant who actually carries out the sub-
stantive criminal acts of the organization.
141
1. Humanitarian Law Project
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Scales opinion in Humanitarian
Law Project III142 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
material support statute, alleging in part that it violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause's requirement of proof of personal
guilt.' 4 3 The Ninth Circuit stopped short of addressing this constitu-
tional challenge by construing § 2339B "to require proof that a person
charged with violating the statute had knowledge of the organization's
designation or knowledge of the unlawful activities that caused it to be
so designated.' 1
44
To reach this construction, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Scales
opinion. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was constitutional to in-
fer a defendant's guilty intent where the defendant had knowledge of
the organization's criminal activities or designation as a foreign terror-
ist organization. 145 Thus, by construing the statute to require knowl-
edge of the foreign terrorist organization's designation or terrorist
activities, the Ninth Circuit satisfied the Scales requirement of
knowledge. 146
137 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000).
138 Scales, 367 U.S. at 205. Scales also challenged his conviction on the theory that
membership in the Communist Party was constitutionally protected speech under the
First Amendment. The Court rejected this argument, citing Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951), and reaffirming that this type of advocacy was not constitu-
tionally protected speech. Scales, 267 U.S. at 228-29.
139 Id. at 221-22.
140 Id. at 228.
141 Id. at 226-27.
142 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
143 Id. at 385.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 394-95.
146 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit held that such a construction was necessary
where the statute criminalized "knowingly" providing material support
to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 47  Without this
construction,
a woman who buys cookies from a bake sale outside of her grocery
store to support displaced Kurdish refugees to find new homes
could be held liable so long as the bake sale had a sign that said that
the sale was sponsored by the [Kurdistan Workers Party, a desig-
nated foreign terrorist organization] without regard to her knowl-
edge of the [group's] designation or other activities. 148
2. United States v. Al-Arian1 49
In A1-Arian, the court reviewed the Humanitarian Law Project III
holding and found that more construction was necessary for § 2339B
to conform to the Constitution.1 50 The court reasoned that the con-
struction in Humanitarian Law Project III failed to comply with the Su-
preme Court's holding in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 15 1 that a
mens rea should apply to each element of the offense. 15 2 Accord-
ingly, the AI-Arian court construed § 2339B such that "knowingly" ap-
plied to both the terrorist organization element (which was the
construction in Humanitarian Law Project III) and the material support
element. 153
The court explained that requiring a mens rea for material sup-
port resolved not only the personal guilt problem, but also vagueness
147 Id. at 402-03.
148 Id. at 402.
149 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
150 Id. at 1339.
151 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
152 Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
153 Id. at 1338-39. The Al-Arian court specifically stated this construction as re-
quiring the following:
[T]o convict a defendant under Section 2339B(a) (1) the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that: (a) the or-
ganization was a [Foreign Terrorist Organization] or had committed unlaw-
ful activities that caused it to be so designated; and (b) what he was
furnishing was "material support." To avoid Fifth Amendment personal
guilt problems, this Court concludes that the government must show more
than a defendant knew something was within a category of "material sup-
port" in order to meet (b). In order to meet (b), the government must show
that the defendant knew (had a specific intent) that the support would fur-
ther the illegal activities of a FTO.
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problems. 5 4 (The court presumably reasoned that if a prosecutor
proved a defendant knew his conduct was "material support," that de-
fendant could not then establish that "material support" was so vague
it was unclear what conduct was included within the term.)
3. The Conflicting Constructions
The Al-Arian court held that Humanitarian Law Project III did not
go far enough in applying the "knowledge" requirement to the ele-
ments of § 2339B. AI-Arian attempted to correct this problem by
holding that the government must establish (1) that the defendant
"knew... what he was furnishing was material support" and (2) that
the defendant "had a specific intent that the support would further the
illegal activities of a [foreign terrorist organization]."155 The AI-Arian
court justified this construction by relying on X-Citement Video.
In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court held that the term "know-
ingly" should apply to both elements of an obscenity law (those ele-
ments being the age of performers and the explicit nature of the
material) .156 X-Citement Video did not require a specific intent be ap-
plied to those elements. By requiring that the government prove a
specific intent on the part of a defendant to "support the illegal activi-
ties" of a designated foreign terrorist organization, the Al-Arian court
went too far in its construction. Under the X-Citement Video analysis,
all that is required is that the defendant have knowledge, not specific
intent.
In contrast to Al-Arian, the Humanitarian Law Project III court saw
no need to construe the "providing material support" portion of the
statute because the "knowingly" element was already included. Sec-
tion 2339B clearly states that "[w] hoever... knowingly provides material
154 Id. at 1339. Curiously, the court thought it would not be difficult for a prose-
cutor to establish a defendant's knowledge that particular conduct was material
support:
Often, such an intent will be easily inferred. For example, ajury could infer
a specific intent to further the illegal activities of a FTO when a defendant
knowingly provides weapons, explosives, or lethal substances to an organiza-
tion that he knows is a FTO because of the nature of the support. Likewise,
a jury could infer a specific intent when a defendant knows that the organi-
zation continues to commit illegal acts and the defendant provides funds to
that organization knowing that money is fungible and, once received, the
donee can use the funds for any purpose it chooses. That is, by its nature,
money carries an inherent danger for furthering the illegal aims of an
organization.
Id.
155 Id. at 1339.
156 X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78.
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support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization" falls under the
proscription of § 2339B. 157 If the term "knowingly" was not intended
to apply to the provision of material support, then why is it in the
statute?
The Al-Arian holding imposes an unnecessary specific intent ele-
ment on § 2339B. While the AI-Arian court is confident this intent
will usually be "easily inferred,"'158 this is uncertain and the construc-
tion is an unwarranted limitation on the legislation Congress
intended.
E. Does the Designation Statute (8 U.S. C. § 1189) Violate the Due Process
Clause by Failing to Provide for Meaningful Review?
Before a defendant can be prosecuted for providing material sup-
port to a designated foreign terrorist organization, that organization
must be designated as such by the Secretary of State.1 59 Some defend-
ants have challenged § 2339B prosecutions by collaterally attacking
the designation process as unconstitutional and arguing that because
of that constitutional defect, designation cannot serve as a predicate
to the § 2339B offense.
1. United States v. Rahmani1 60
In Rahmani, the government charged multiple defendants with
conspiracy to provide material support to the Mujahedin-e Khalq
(MEK), a designated foreign terrorist organization.1 61 The govern-
ment alleged that the defendants had raised money for and made do-
nations to MEK in violation of § 2339B. 162  The defendants
challenged the constitutionality of their indictment on the ground
that the designation of MEK as a foreign terrorist organization under
8 U.S.C. § 1189 violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
and could therefore not be used as a predicate in their case.
The defendants faced several obstacles in contesting the constitu-
tionality of MEK's designation as a foreign terrorist organization.
First, the government argued that by the terms of the designation stat-
ute, only the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia (or the United States Supreme Court) could review the
157 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a)(1) (2000).
158 Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1339-40.
159 For an explanation of the statutory designation scheme, see supra text accom-
panying notes 11-12.
160 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
161 Id. at 1047.
162 Id.
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constitutionality of a designation under § 1189.163 The Rahmani
court, however, reasoned that while § 1189 provided for an organiza-
tion to review its designation in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the statute did not expressly preclude considera-
tion of the issue in the other federal courts. 164 To support this reason-
ing, the Rahmani court cited to the Johnson v. Robison165 principle that
a statute restricting access to judicial review must do so by "clear and
convincing evidence of Congressional intent to impose such a restric-
tion."166 Therefore, the Rahmani court held it could properly con-
sider the constitutionality of a designation under § 1189.167
The second obstacle for defendants was the express language of
§ 1189 precluding the use of "unconstitutional designation" as a de-
fense. Specifically, § 1189 provides: "If a designation under this sub-
section has become effective.., a defendant in a criminal action shall
not be permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the
issuance of such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial
or hearing."1 68
The Rahmani court rejected this limitation, and refused to "turn a
blind eye to the Constitutional infirmities of § 1189 when it supplies a
necessary predicate to the charged offense."'169 The court further
held that § 1189 was an impermissible restriction on the court's ability
to consider constitutional challenges. 170
The Rahmani court was now prepared to consider the defend-
ants' argument that designation of the MEK as a foreign terrorist or-
ganization violated due process and therefore could not serve as the
predicate to a § 2339B indictment. The court considered the proce-
dures specified in § 1189 for judicial review of a designation-specifi-
cally that any review was based solely on the record compiled by the
State Department and that the designated organization had no right
to notice or participation in the review. The Rahmani court held that
because an organization designated under § 1189 had no opportunity
to participate in meaningful review of the designation, any designa-
tion under § 1189 violated Due Process and § 1189 was unconstitu-
tional on its face. 171
163 See 18 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000).
164 Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
165 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
166 Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (citing Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373-74).
167 Id. at 1053.
168 18 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2000).
169 Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
170 Id. at 1054.
171 Id. at 1058.
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The Rahmani court concluded that because the designation of
MEK as a foreign terrorist organization was unconstitutional, that des-
ignation could not function as the predicate for a § 2339B indictment.
Consequently, the court granted the Rahmani defendants' motion to
dismiss. 172
2. United States v. Sattar
Relying on the favorable holding in Rahmani, the Sattar defend-
ants urged the court to dismiss their § 2339B indictment on the the-
ory that it was predicated on an unconstitutional designation. The
Sattar court dismissed the Rahmani holding as unpersuasive. 173 The
Sattar court held that the defendants lacked standing to raise the due
process rights of a third party (the designated foreign terrorist
organization). 174
The court further recognized that while some meaningful review
of an administrative proceeding (such as designation) was necessary
under due process in a criminal case, 175 that review was provided for
in the statute. 176 In the statute, it is clear that Congress intended for
review only where the organization challenged the designation before
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within the
allotted time. 177 The Sattar court concluded by denying the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss (as to the theory that the indictment was pred-
icated on an unconstitutional designation). 178
3. United States v. AI-Arian
Also relying on the Rahmani decision, the defendants in Al-Arian
challenged their § 2339B indictment on similar grounds. 179 The Al-
Arian defendants were accused of providing funding and organiza-
tional support to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). °80 The defend-
172 Id. at 1059.
173 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
174 Id. (citing Center for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 204 F.3d 183, 196 (2d
Cir. 2002)).
175 Id. at 363-65 (citing United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987)).
176 Id. at 367 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b) (2000)). "Not later than 30 days after
publication of the designation in the Federal Register, an organization designated as
a foreign terrorist organization may seek judicial review of the designation in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(b)(1) (2000).
177 See8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1).
178 Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84.
179 United States v. A-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1344-45 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
180 Id. at 1327-28.
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ants argued that the court should dismiss their indictment because PIJ
had been denied due process in the designation process.1 8'
Like Sattar, the court held that the defendants, as third parties to
the designation, did not have standing to mount a collateral attack
against that designation. 182 The court went further, stating that even
if the defendants had standing to challenge the designation, PIJ's des-
ignation as a foreign terrorist organization did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 183 The court reasoned that be-
cause PIJ had no substantial connections to the United States, PIJ was
not entitled to Fifth Amendment due process rights.18 4 Like Sattar,
the Al-Arian court rejected the defendants' unconstitutional designa-
tion argument and denied the motion to dismiss. 185
Clearly, these two courts have not followed the Rahmani decision.
On the contrary, they have found multiple reasons to reject defense
arguments relying on Rahmani (i.e., lack of standing for a collateral
attack and provision for meaningful review in the statute).
E. Is Lawful Combatant Immunity as Defined in the Geneva Convention
a Valid Defense to a § 2339B Prosecution?
A final challenge, unique to the Lindh case, is lawful combatant
immunity. This is not a constitutional objection, but is included here
for its potential relevance if the government chooses to prosecute
under § 2339B any of the Guantanamo detainees captured while fight-
ifig in Afghanistan. Lawful combatant immunity protects "lawful com-
batants" from criminal prosecution by hostile governments. 186
In Lindh, the government charged the defendant, John Walker
Lindh, with providing material support in the form of personnel
(himself) to designated foreign terrorist organizations. Lindh, an
American citizen, had traveled to Pakistan, trained in military camps
run by Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) (a designated foreign terrorist
181 Id. at 1344.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1347.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3384, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 202 [hereinafter GPW]. GPW article 87
states: "Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts of
the Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of members
of the armed forces of the said Power who have committed the same acts." Id. art. 87,
6 U.S.J. at 3384, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202.
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organization), trained at the al-Farooq1 87 camp run by al-Qaeda (a
designated foreign terrorist organization), met personally with Osama
Bin Laden, and fought for the Taliban on the front lines of the war in
Afghanistan. 188
Part of Lindh's defense strategy was to argue that he was a lawful
combatant and was therefore entitled to immunity from prosecution
under the international laws of war. 189 Lindh asserted this defense
with respect to charges of aiding the Taliban, but not charges of aid-
ing al-Qaeda.190 The court, recognizing this, agreed that "there is no
plausible claim of lawful combatant immunity in connection with al-
Qaeda membership. '" 191
With respect to the charges of aiding the Taliban, the Lindh court
considered the defense of lawful combatant immunity in light of the
requirements for lawful combatant status set forth in the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). 192
Those requirements are
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war. 19 3
The court held that with the exception of carrying arms openly,
Lindh and his fellow Taliban fighters failed to satisfy the requirements
of the GPW for lawful combatant status. 194 This is in agreement with
the President's assertion on February 7, 2002, that the Taliban were
not lawful combatants and not entitled to the protections of the
GPW.195
187 Recall that Al-Farooq is the same training camp attended by the Lackawanna
defendants.
188 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 546 (E.D. Va. 2002).
189 Id. at 552-54.
190 Id. at 553.
191 Id. at 553 n.16.
192 GPW, supra note 186.
193 Id. art. 4(a)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
194 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58.
195 See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Status of Detain-
ees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2002/02/20020207-13.html. While the court gave some deference to the
President's classification of the Taliban as unlawful combatants, it did not find this
controlling. The court held that the Taliban's status as lawful or unlawful combatants
was a justiciable question. See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 554-56.
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A similar holding will likely result if the government charges addi-
tional Taliban fighters with material support of a terrorist organiza-
tion.196 Because the Taliban does not conform to the requirements
set forth in the GPW, defendants will not be entitled to lawful combat-
ant immunity.
F Summary of Challenges to Material Support Prosecutions
Defendants have not been successful in challenging the material
support statute on the theory that it imposes guilt by association in
violation of the First Amendment. 197 While the Constitution does
guarantee the right to associate, courts have found that § 2339B
criminalizes more than mere association and serves an important na-
tional security interest.198
Defendants have similarly been unsuccessful in challenging the
material support statute for overbreadth due to the Supreme Court's
high standard and Congress's strong national security interest in stop-
ping terrorist financing. 199
On challenges for vagueness, courts have been less consistent.
While some courts presented with unique facts (i.e., Humanitarian
Law Project II, which dealt with a civil action for injunctive relief, and
Sattar, which addressed a criminal action against a convicted terror-
ist's lawyer) have found material support provisions impermissibly
vague, those courts dealing with clear aid to a terrorist organization
(Lindh and Goba) have held that the statute gave fair notice. This is
reasonable under Supreme Court precedent on vagueness because a
less stringent standard applies when the conduct in question is not
constitutionally protected (for instance, traveling to Afghanistan to
serve in a terrorist organization). 200
To comply with the Fifth Amendment requirement of personal
guilt, some courts have construed the material support statute to re-
quire knowledge that the organization in question was connected to
terrorism (Humanitarian Law Project III). This should not be an issue
for the government to prove in most material support cases. For ex-
ample, in Lindh and Goba, while the defendants were training at the
al-Farooq camp, they clearly had knowledge that it was connected to
196 Although the Taliban itself is not a designated foreign terrorist organization,
these fighters (like Lindh) may also be involved with al-Qaeda.
197 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70; Humanitarian Law Project I, 9 F. Supp. 2d
1205, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
198 Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70.
199 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Lindh, 212 F.
Supp. 2d at 572.
200 See discussion supra Part III.C.
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terrorism. The court in Al-Arian, however, construed the material
support statute to require a specific intent.20 1 This is an unnecessary
legal construction, goes well beyond Congress's intent in enacting the
material support statute, and imposes a difficult hurdle for prosecu-
tors in material support cases.20 2
Some defendants have challenged not only the material support
statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), but the designation statute (8 U.S.C.
§ 1189) as well. In Rahmani, the court declared the designation stat-
ute facially unconstitutional in violation of due process and held that
no material support prosecution could rely on an unconstitutional
designation as a predicate.20 3 This holding, however, has been re-
jected by other courts20 4 and is currently on appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit. With the exception of Rahmani, most courts have found that the
designation statute complies with due process and that defendants
lack standing to collaterally attack designation.
A final challenge to the material support statute (currently
unique to the John Walker Lindh case but potentially important if the
government prosecutes more Taliban fighters) is the defense of lawful
combatant immunity under the Geneva Convention. This was easily
rejected by the Lindh court on a finding that the Taliban failed to
comply with the Geneva Convention requirements for lawful combat-
ant status. 2
0 5
The material support statute has been considered in many courts
in recent years, and despite some successful arguments by defendants,
most courts have upheld § 2339B in cases where the defendants
clearly aided a terrorist organization. The federal government should
continue to exercise caution in approving § 2339B prosecutions to
avoid the development of restrictive precedent. Based on recent
court decisions, prosecutors should be able to continue using the ma-
terial support statute as an effective tool in the war on terror.
MV. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B are sentenced
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). Pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,206 and promulgated by the
201 See United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2004).
202 See discussion supra Part III.D.
203 United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
204 See Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1346; Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
205 See Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 554-55.
206 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98
Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (1992).
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United States Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines provide a struc-
tured process for a sentencing judge to determine a defendant's sen-
tencing range. (The judge then has discretion to sentence an
offender to a definite term within that range.) The Guidelines are
designed to ensure sentencing uniformity among similar criminal of-
fenders and sentencing proportionality for crimes of varying sever-
ity. 20 7 Congress has specifically mandated that the sentences under
the Guidelines take into account:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense; to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant .... 208
Under the Guidelines, a sentencing judge first calculates the de-
fendant's total offense level; this is based on the severity of the of-
fense, specific characteristics of the offense, and other pre-determined
adjustments (role in the offense, acceptance of responsibility, etc.).20 9
Based on these calculations, the offense level is graded from one
(least serious) to forty-three (most serious). A sentencing judge then
determines a defendant's criminal history using a point system to ac-
count for prior offenses; criminal history is graded from I (no crimi-
nal history) to VI (most serious criminal history).210 Based on these
two numbers-offense level and criminal history-the sentencing
judge determines the defendant's sentencing range.2 11
The base offense level for a § 2339B material support conviction
is twenty-six (with specific offense enhancements if the offense in-
volved dangerous weapons, explosives, or the provision of support
with the intent to commit or assist in the commission of a violent
act).212 Hypothetically then, if an individual convicted under § 2339B
had no criminal history, and was not subject to any enhancements or
departures, the guideline range would equate to sixty-three to seventy-
207 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lAI, cmt. n.3 (2004).
208 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000).
209 JiMmy GURULE, COMPLEX CRIMINAL LITIGATION: PROSECUTING DRUG ENTERPRISES
AND ORGANIZED CRIME 694-97 (1996).
210 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2004).
211 Note that other considerations may be brought into calculation, for instance
relevant conduct or substantial assistance to federal agents.
212 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2M5.3 (2004).
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eight months (about five to six years). 213 Under the Guidelines how-
ever, individuals convicted under § 2339B are subject to a sentencing
enhancement for a crime involving a "federal crime of terrorism." 214
This enhancement automatically increases the offense level for a
§ 2339B conviction by twelve levels2 15 and raises the criminal history
category to VI. Using this enhancement, that same defendant with a
§ 2339B conviction and no criminal history would face a sentencing
range of thirty years to life.
No defendant would actually receive that sentence, however, be-
cause the statutory maximum for a § 2339B offense is fifteen years
imprisonment. 216 How can the Guidelines sentence for a § 2339B
conviction possibly be within the scope of Congress's intent when the
minimum sentence for a typical offender with no criminal history is
double the statutory maximum?
In United States v. Meskini,217 the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to provide material support to a terrorist act (a crime
under 18 U.S.C. § 371)218 for planning to bomb Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport during the millennium celebrations in December
1999.219 The defendants faced a terrorism sentence adjustment
under Guidelines § 3A1.4 and challenged this enhancement as having
no rational basis and violating due process. Defendants argued the
enhancement impermissibly double-counted the same criminal act by
increasing both the offense level and criminal history. The Second
Circuit dismissed the defendants' argument, stating:
Congress and the Sentencing Commission had a rational basis for
concluding that an act of terrorism represents a particularly grave
threat because of the dangerousness of the crime and the difficulty
of deterring and rehabilitating the criminal, and thus that terrorists
213 Id. § 5A.
214 Id. § 3A1.4.
Victim-related Adjustments . .. Terrorism:
(a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a
federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the resulting of-
fense level is less than level 32, increase to level 32.
(b) In each such case, the defendant's criminal history category from Chap-
ter Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) shall be Category
VI.
Id.
215 If the resulting offense level is less than thirty-two, the court should increase
the offense level to thirty-two. Id.
216 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (1) (2000).
217 319 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003).
218 Id. at 90.
219 Id. at 90-91.
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and their supporters should be incapacitated for a longer period of
time. Thus, the terrorism guideline legitimately considers a single
act of terrorism for both the offense level and the criminal history
category.
220
The Second Circuit dismissed the defendants' other challenges
and affirmed the convictions.
22 1
Although the Second Circuit has held that the § 3A1.4 sentenc-
ing enhancement does not violate due process, the Guidelines'
scheme for a § 2339B offense is seemingly illogical. First, because it is
a "federal crime of terrorism" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g) (5),
the § 3A1.4 "adjustment" automatically applies to every § 2339B of-
fense. In this sense, it is not an adjustment at all, but rather a new
base offense level that also mandates the highest criminal history cate-
gory. Second, Congress tasked the Sentencing Commission in design-
ing the Guidelines to account for "the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."2 2 2 This
enhancement automatically sets the criminal history category to VI-
for any defendant from a first-time offender to a life-long terrorist-
completely disregarding the history and characteristics of the defen-
dant.2 23 Third, for the standard § 2339B defendant (not subject to
any adjustment or departures) the minimum Guidelines sentence
under § 3A1.4 is thirty years,2 24 double the maximum statutory sentence
of fifteen years. This considerable difference in sentences illustrates
the substantial disconnect between § 2339B and Guidelines § 3A1.4.
One's first reaction may be that the application of the § 3A4.1
enhancement to § 2339B offenders is outside Congress's intent, be-
cause it automatically imposes a sentence in excess of the statutory
maximum and disregards the defendant's actual criminal history.
However, the application of the § 3A1.4 enhancement to federal
crimes of terrorism (including § 2339B material support) was man-
dated by Congress in AEDPA-the very same law that created the
§ 2339B material support statute-so Congress's intent to apply
Guidelines § 3A1.4 to § 2339B convictions is clear. 22 5
220 Id. at 92.
221 Id. at 93.
222 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000) (emphasis added).
223 Defendants have raised this argument. See Meskini, 319 F.3d at 92.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
225 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32,
§ 730, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303 ("Directions to the Sentencing Commission. The United
States Sentencing Commission shall forthwith ... amend the sentencing guidelines so
that the chapter 3 adjustment relating to international terrorism only applies to Fed-
eral Crimes of terrorism, as defined in 2332b(g) of Title 18, United States Code.").
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Surely Congress has a substantial interest in providing severe pun-
ishments for crimes related to terrorism; however, there should be
some consistency in sentencing policy between the offense statute and
the related guidelines. If Congress truly desires to apply Guidelines
§ 3A1.4 to all § 2339B offenders, they should increase the statutory
maximum under § 2339B. That increase, however, would result in
enormous thirty year sentences for first-time offenders. It would be
more appropriate (and more consistent with the goal of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines to account for a defendant's history and characteris-
tics), for Congress to direct the Sentencing Commission to develop an
enhancement for crimes related to terrorism that did not automati-
cally place the typical offender so far outside the fifteen year statutory
maximum. Or alternatively, simply adjust the base offense levels for
federal terrorism crimes-because having an adjustment that auto-
matically applies to every offender seems unnecessarily redundant.
The application of the Guidelines is an important part of any
§ 2339B prosecution-the goals of the material support statute can-
not be accomplished if offenders are not eventually incarcerated.
Given the importance of this statute to the war on terrorism and ter-
rorist funding, it is essential that the Guidelines applying to a § 2339B
conviction make sense-and are not in danger of a due process chal-
lenge for lacking a rational basis. Although the Meskini court rejected
the defendants' due process challenge, there is a definite disconnect
between the material support statute and the Sentencing Guidelines.
To ensure the continued viability of § 2339B, Congress should direct
the Sentencing Commission to amend the § 3A1.4 enhancement (or
the § 2339B base offense level) to account for an offender's actual
criminal history and so that the Guidelines' sentencing range is not
automatically outside the statutory maximum. This modification need
not result in shorter sentences for alleged terrorists (an obvious politi-
cal loser), but it would provide for a more sensible and consistent sen-
tencing policy with respect to § 2339B material support offenses.
CONCLUSION
If the rule of law is to be effective in fighting the war on terror,
prosecutors must have effective and viable legislation available to pros-
ecute those who support terrorist organizations. The material support
statute fulfills this need; it has been used in several successful prosecu-
tions of individuals who supported terrorist organizations through a
variety of means. The statute's power lies in its flexibility-the mate-
rial support statute applies not only to offenders who provide funding
to a terrorist organization, but also to those who support the organiza-
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tion by serving in its ranks and training in its camps. Without
§ 2339B, prosecutors may be faced with the troubling prospect of
identifying a terrorist threat but lacking the ability to charge the sus-
pects. The material support statute allows prosecutors to incapacitate
a potential terrorist cell that supports a terrorist organization without
having to wait for an actual terrorist plot by that cell to take shape or
be enacted. Section 2339B empowers federal prosecutors to prevent
terrorism by incapacitating those who support terrorist organizations
and eliminating terrorist threats.
Although courts have found some constitutional issues (primarily
in cases where the material support statute has been applied to
unique circumstances), the law has been (and should continue to be)
upheld when applied to clear cases of support of a terrorist organiza-
tion. The Justice Department should continue to exercise restraint in
bringing § 2339B cases to avoid the development of negative prece-
dent and overly restrictive case law. One area where revision may be
necessary is not within the material support statute itself, but rather
the Guidelines applicable to material support conviction. To reflect a
more unified sentencing policy, Congress should direct the Sentenc-
ing Commission to reconcile the inconsistencies between the statutory
maximum in the material support statute and the terrorism sentenc-
ing enhancement that automatically applies to a material support
conviction.
The material support statute is a controversial but essential tool
in the war on terror. For the rule of law to prevail in the fight against
terrorism, the federal government must continue to prosecute terror-
ist supporters under the material support statute and ensure its con-
tinued viability before the courts.
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